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genetic—which has caused the omission from the work of Mr. Stout of all those higher topics which would have had very fruitful discussion from the noetic side, but which might have imperilled the author's freedom when he comes to write his book on the genetic. At any rate, it is one of the present writer's main points of curiosity to see what Mr. Stout will do with his doctrine of mental activity when he interprets the minds of the animals, the insects, and the amœbæ. And if he had only committed himself in this work to views on the ethical, the social, and the religious, it would have excited the same curiosity to see their later application in the fields of ethnology. But here he has left himself a free hand, to the great impoverishment of the present work, as it must be confessed.

Ethical readers will be interested in the chapters on Attention, Conation, and Belief, which are among the best where the level of all is high, and less interested in that on Pleasure and Pain, which is the poorest where none are poor.

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HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. Translated by S. W. Dyde, M.A., D.Sc., Professor of Mental Philosophy, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Bell, 1896. Pp. xxx., 365.

Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" or "of Law," the work here translated, forms the eighth volume of the collected works as published after Hegel's death. It consists, as the translator's preface informs us (why, however, is not the original "editor's preface" reproduced in the translation?), of "paragraphs" and "notes," both from Hegel's own hand, constituting the work as published by Hegel in 1820; together with "additions," drawn from students' notes of the lectures, which appeared for the first time in the posthumous edition of 1833.

The work of 1820 was itself a reproduction in fuller form of a portion of the third division of the "Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences," which appeared as a whole in 1817. Its three divisions were the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Mind. The last of these fell into three portions or subdivisions: Mind Subjective (what we might call Mental Philosophy,—Anthropology and Psychology), Mind Objective, which coincides with the Philosophy of Right, including what we might call Jurisprudence and Moral and Political Philosophy; and Mind Absolute, covering

the ground of art, philosophy, and religion. The Philosophy of Mind has recently been translated by Professor Wallace; and his volume, with its luminous introductory essays, will be an almost indispensable companion to the Philosophy of Right, which is now before us.

The place of the Philosophy of Right in the total Philosophy of Mind reveals one great aspect of Hegel's conception of the subject. Law, Will, and Society appear as stages of man's endeavor to find his true self, to realize all that his mind has in it to be. He grows into these manifestations *pari passu* as he becomes an intelligence and a will, and so we find them to be the culmination of anthropology and psychology. But even the State is not ultimate, and behind and above it we see the deepest and highest modes in which man has grasped at the universe, modes which are prior to any individual State, and survive it, and embody the eternal which no State can wholly attain. The State was merely mind objective; but these are the modes of mind absolute,—art, philosophy, religion.

And the inward structure of the Philosophy of Right reveals an analogous progression,—a progression not in time, but in grades of adequacy or perfection. Abstract law—the right before which all are *prima facie* equal, is the simplest condition of realized will or social being. Beyond and over against this comes the sphere of morality; the will that claims to be good by its pure intention, by the mere fact that it is the utterance of individual conscience; as the reconciliation of these two tendencies we have thirdly the realm of social ethics—life organized in institutions and ordinances through which man finds his will,—what he really wants,—*i.e.*, what in some degree makes possible for him a satisfactory life—in a detailed system of rights and duties. In these his will is still his own, and individual, but yet the organization of his relations and purposes brings him into harmony with the orderly fabric sustained by law.

It will be seen how far-reaching is Hegel's view outside the realm of law, morality, and politics, and how profound is the continuity which it suggests within that sphere. It is a great thing to have such a work in an English version; and Professor Dyde's translation will convey the essential purport to the reader, though he has permitted himself a degree of inaccuracy in detail which the demands of free rendering do not seem to justify.

B. BOSANQUET.